New Jersey Criminal Lawyer Blog

Part III: More Exceptions
Another exception is the "community caretaking" exception, which means what the name implies, that the search is performed without a warrant in the interests of the safety of the people or citizenry. In State v. Hill, 115 N.J. 169, 178 (1989), the Court noted that the community caretaking exception has been applied mainly to the context of an impounded vehicle. This exception has been extended under the "Special Needs" rule. When the State can show that the purpose of a warrantless search was to protect the property or safety of its citizens, the courts assess the lawfulness of police conduct on the flexible standard of reasonableness of the police action under the particular circumstances of the case. See State v. Diloreto, 180 N.J. 264, 275-76 (2004). To the average person, this wouldn't instill a whole lot of confidence. But consider, for examples of what reasonableness means, that the person in the presence of police may have recently been involved in a major crime, Cf. State v. Faretra, 330 N.J.Super. 527 (App. Div.), certif. den. 165 N.J. 530 (2000), or there a weapon is at the scene, Cf. State v. Navarro, 310 N.J.Super. 104 (App. Div.), certif. den. 156 N.J. 382 (1998) and State v. Padilla, 321 N.J.Super. 96 (App. Div. 1999), aff'd 163 N.J. 3 (2000).

Further, "exigent circumstances" is a narrowly construed exception, in the medical sense. The medical emergency exigency test is met upon "a prudent and reasonably based belief that there is a potential medical emergency of unknown dimension." State v. Castro, 238 N.J.Super. 482, 489 (App. Div. 1990). In State v. Scott, 231 N.J.Super. 258, 275 (App. Div. 1989)(Ashbey, J., dissenting), rev'd on dissent below 118 N.J. 406 (1990), the court articulated the three elements to the emergency-aid exception: (1) the existence of an emergency as viewed objectively; (2) a search not motivated by a desire to find evidence; and (3) a nexus between the search and the emergency were satisfied by the facts of the case. The circumstances should present "sufficient exigency created by the information imparted ... to justify immediate action by [the officer], as distinct from retreating and initiating warrant procedures." State v. Castro, supra, 238 N.J.Super. at 487. That should make the average person feel a little better.

These principals are important to know if a police officer knocks on your door because it is the only way you can protect your rights. After the fact, an attorney can help sort through the details to determine the best criminal defense.

Part I
The "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 3131972). Accordingly, it is well established that "searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable," Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980), and so "prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984). This is a constitutional right that should be protected by your attorney in any criminal defense case.

As noted in Welsh: Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the home, the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, that presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. 466 U.S. at 750.

In other words, the Court assumes that entry without a warrant is barred, and the burden is on the state to prove that the police had an urgency reason that prevented the ability to first obtain a warrant. If they cannot, any type of evidence obtained as a result of that entry will not be permitted to be relied upon at trial (fruit of the poisonous tree).

For example, in State v. Holland, 328 N.J.Super. 1 (App. Div. 2000), the officers conducted a warrantless search of a residence based upon the smell of burning marijuana emanating from the home. The average person would assume that the police could use that scent to generate probable cause. Probable cause should justify a warrant, not warrantless entry or entry without consent. If the suspect voluntarily permitted the police in, or if the suspect voluntarily left the home, that is a different legal situation. In this instance, relying upon several rulings of the United States Supreme Court which stress the sanctity of a person's home, the Holland Court found that there was probable cause to believe someone possessed marijuana, which is a disorderly persons offense, but the minor offense did not generate the exigent circumstances which would justify a warrantless search or arrest in the suspect's home. 328 N.J.Super. at 7. In that type of situation, anything the police found or were told when they entered the home without consent that would incriminate a suspect is barred.