Evander Holyfield is guilty of hitting his wife several times, according to her recent police report, and she got a temporary protective order against him. He has not been charged, however, and police have been silent as to whether there is an ongoing criminal investigation. She claims that the boxer hit her in the face, head and back after she would not produce check stubs from church donations. Apparently, he was worried that she was not giving money to the church.

Mr. Holyfield, according to the order, is not to be within 500 yards of Mrs. Holyfield, 30 years of age, and their 6 year-old son and 5 year-old daughter, until a February 18th hearing. His third wife, Mrs. Holyfield states that emotional abuse started soon after their marriage, and that emotional and physical abuse have been escalating since then. Publicly, however, they remain steadfastly devoted to each other and their marriage.

In New Jersey, domestic violence is one person's attempt to control another via harmful acts, be they physical, sexual, emotional or verbal, with whom he or she has had a "dating" relationship, though it could be a parent or caretaker. So those who are or were dating, are or were married, have shared or share living quarters fall under the requirements. "Harmful" could include criminal acts from false imprisonment to stalking to criminal trespass. To get a "TRO" or protective order, an alleged victim files a complaint with the family division of Superior Court, where a judge will consider the history of domestic violence, whether or not the victim is in immediate danger, and what measures will sufficiently protect him or her. This is a civil legal action, but a criminal complaint may be filed as well, and once a TRO is filed the alleged abuser can be held in criminal contempt for violating it. Because it is temporary, a TRO is fairly easily obtained from the Court.

A hearing is held ten days later for the judge to determine if a final restraining order, or FRO, is warranted, and for how long. At a final hearing, both parties may speak, and offer evidence and question witnesses on the record. Therefore, of course, it is important to have the aid of an attorney if at all possible, in order to protect your rights. The boxer may be trying to exercise control over Mrs. Holyfield, and their money, and at the time of filing she had a problem with it. She claimed that he choked her in front of their daughter and that he hit her in front of their children. Later, she released a statement saying that Mr. Holyfield "has many qualities and characteristics that [she] admires and respects. We are all human." Of course, the legal system will be there for her should she determine that such behavior towards herself and around her children is not human.

Part III: More Exceptions
Another exception is the "community caretaking" exception, which means what the name implies, that the search is performed without a warrant in the interests of the safety of the people or citizenry. In State v. Hill, 115 N.J. 169, 178 (1989), the Court noted that the community caretaking exception has been applied mainly to the context of an impounded vehicle. This exception has been extended under the "Special Needs" rule. When the State can show that the purpose of a warrantless search was to protect the property or safety of its citizens, the courts assess the lawfulness of police conduct on the flexible standard of reasonableness of the police action under the particular circumstances of the case. See State v. Diloreto, 180 N.J. 264, 275-76 (2004). To the average person, this wouldn't instill a whole lot of confidence. But consider, for examples of what reasonableness means, that the person in the presence of police may have recently been involved in a major crime, Cf. State v. Faretra, 330 N.J.Super. 527 (App. Div.), certif. den. 165 N.J. 530 (2000), or there a weapon is at the scene, Cf. State v. Navarro, 310 N.J.Super. 104 (App. Div.), certif. den. 156 N.J. 382 (1998) and State v. Padilla, 321 N.J.Super. 96 (App. Div. 1999), aff'd 163 N.J. 3 (2000).

Further, "exigent circumstances" is a narrowly construed exception, in the medical sense. The medical emergency exigency test is met upon "a prudent and reasonably based belief that there is a potential medical emergency of unknown dimension." State v. Castro, 238 N.J.Super. 482, 489 (App. Div. 1990). In State v. Scott, 231 N.J.Super. 258, 275 (App. Div. 1989)(Ashbey, J., dissenting), rev'd on dissent below 118 N.J. 406 (1990), the court articulated the three elements to the emergency-aid exception: (1) the existence of an emergency as viewed objectively; (2) a search not motivated by a desire to find evidence; and (3) a nexus between the search and the emergency were satisfied by the facts of the case. The circumstances should present "sufficient exigency created by the information imparted ... to justify immediate action by [the officer], as distinct from retreating and initiating warrant procedures." State v. Castro, supra, 238 N.J.Super. at 487. That should make the average person feel a little better.

These principals are important to know if a police officer knocks on your door because it is the only way you can protect your rights. After the fact, an attorney can help sort through the details to determine the best criminal defense.

Part II Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement:
A basic principle of Fourth Amendment law is that "searches and seizure inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 5861980). The State bears the burden of proving that a warrantless search falls within one of the few, narrowly circumscribed exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 7 (1980). Of course, if police have entered your home without permission without a warrant resulting in criminal charges, you should contact an attorney immediately.

One such exception is the "protective sweep." In Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), the Unites States Supreme Court determined the circumstances under which the police may perform a warrantless protective sweep of a defendant's premises incident to an arrest in order to ascertain the presence of any dangerous third parties. The Court held that the Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. Id. at 327, 334, 337. Such a protective sweep is not a full search of the premises, but may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where a person may be found. Id. at 335. The sweep is to last no longer than is necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and depart the premises. Id. at 336. Thus an officer's search for contraband or other evidence incident to an arrest does not constitute a protective sweep, and therefore cannot be based upon merely a reasonable suspicion.

New Jersey also has addressed protective sweeps. In State v. Henry, 133 N.J. 104, 118 (1993), the Court held that upon arresting an individual, "[t]he police may also 'fan out' and conduct a protective sweep of the area if they have reason to believe that they may be in danger from other parties on the premises." In State v. Doyle, 42 N.J. 334 (1964), the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the key to the propriety of a search is when the defendant was arrested. Police may not search in order to arrest, and a search to uncover evidence upon which to arrest is not made lawful because the desired evidence is obtained. Id. at 342. Absent a valid search warrant, the police must actually perform a valid arrest at same time that they performed the search that police justify as incident to an arrest. Id. at 342-43.

It is important to note that the scope of the sweep is a crucial factor. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the Court held that in the absence of a search warrant, the justifiable search incident to an in-home arrest could not extend beyond the arrestee's person and the area from within which he might have obtained a weapon. A search of a person or things within his immediate control or of the place of arrest to the extent that it is within his immediate possession or control is considered incidental to the arrest. Doyle, supra, 42 N.J. at 344. If police fish around beyond the area where a person might be able to reach, for example, evidence they find is not permissible in Court. Police then arguably must be able to convince the court that the evidence of danger was in reach. The experience of a police search and seizure at the home can be overwhelming, which is why these facts are best examined by a skilled attorney in order to determine the best defense strategy.

Part I
The "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 3131972). Accordingly, it is well established that "searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable," Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980), and so "prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984). This is a constitutional right that should be protected by your attorney in any criminal defense case.

As noted in Welsh: Before agents of the government may invade the sanctity of the home, the burden is on the government to demonstrate exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. When the government's interest is only to arrest for a minor offense, that presumption of unreasonableness is difficult to rebut, and the government usually should be allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. 466 U.S. at 750.

In other words, the Court assumes that entry without a warrant is barred, and the burden is on the state to prove that the police had an urgency reason that prevented the ability to first obtain a warrant. If they cannot, any type of evidence obtained as a result of that entry will not be permitted to be relied upon at trial (fruit of the poisonous tree).

For example, in State v. Holland, 328 N.J.Super. 1 (App. Div. 2000), the officers conducted a warrantless search of a residence based upon the smell of burning marijuana emanating from the home. The average person would assume that the police could use that scent to generate probable cause. Probable cause should justify a warrant, not warrantless entry or entry without consent. If the suspect voluntarily permitted the police in, or if the suspect voluntarily left the home, that is a different legal situation. In this instance, relying upon several rulings of the United States Supreme Court which stress the sanctity of a person's home, the Holland Court found that there was probable cause to believe someone possessed marijuana, which is a disorderly persons offense, but the minor offense did not generate the exigent circumstances which would justify a warrantless search or arrest in the suspect's home. 328 N.J.Super. at 7. In that type of situation, anything the police found or were told when they entered the home without consent that would incriminate a suspect is barred.

A defendant who pleaded guilty to assault, and charged with drunken driving, drug possession among other things, fled his home state recently. But according to a report, he virtually turned himself in using Facebook. He was living in a nearby state since the fall, and has been wanted by police for failure to appear at his sentencing. Perhaps he didn't realize that police use the Internet too. The tech-savvy police posted a thank-you note too, for the defendant's diligent status posts, which led them to his whereabouts.

A 17 year-old girl pleaded guilty to misdemeanor driving while intoxicated and criminally negligent homicide connected to a car crash that killed her boyfriend. She was driving drunk in the middle of the night, and crashed her car into a brick pole. She had a blood alcohol level of .13 % and was driving 56 m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.h. zone. Basically, she got behind the wheel of a car while drunk, and should have known that doing so could easily kill someone. Every state, including New Jersey, has its own requirements, definitions and terms for driving while under the influence of drugs or alcohol and the crimes that stem from that action. As always, it is crucial to consult an attorney well versed in those laws.

The Judge denied her youthful offender status and imposed a 6-month jail sentence reportedly because he had seen a picture she posted of herself on Facebook. The photograph was taken of her one month after the crash, and she posted it captioned "drunk in Florida." She could have gotten as much as 4 years in state prison, but the Judge reportedly felt forced to consider her young age and clear history.

Her drivers license is revoked, and following her jail sentence, she will be under electronic home monitoring for one year and on probation for five, during which she is not allowed to drink under its terms.

A judge wants to see a remorseful defendant regardless of the crimes he or she has been charged with or found guilty of, and evidence to the contrary is extremely damaging. The Judge is free to consider all factors that have any arguable relevance. Every defendant should keep in mind that the Judge wants to see that his or her encounter with the criminal justice system has taught a lesson and changed his or her behavior for the better. The Internet has created a new environment in which to evaluate a defendant's behavior, and it is completely public. There is a new way we are all being held accountable for our behavior, and the legal profession is aware, that is nothing new. The consequences can clearly be harsh, and it is yet another lesson young adults have to learn.

Arrested on drunken and careless driving charges, NFL linebacker Rey Maualuga reportedly hit a parking meter and two cars after a traffic accident was called in to local police. Apparently, after police were notified of the incident, the officers were able to conclude that Maualuga was driving the Pontiac that had hit the parked cars and meter. There were two female passengers with him who were released and not charged.

According to reports, he had a blood alcohol content of .157, admitted to having six drinks, and failed field sobriety tests. He had bloodshot eyes, slurred speech and was visibly unsteady. His first arrest was in 2005 on charges of misdemeanor battery, after he got in a fight at a party as a college freshman. Upon agreeing to community service, counseling and attending Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, the charges were dismissed.

It is unclear how police connected the football player to the car after the fact. This continues a trend of Cincinnati Bengals players that have been arrested in past years. Under New Jersey law, even if the police do not see the accident in progress, police can arrest someone after the fact if the officer can trace the car to the driver, and the driver is intoxicated. In this case it appears that happened and Maualuga was visibly intoxicated so he was charged. An experienced, skilled attorney can analyze the circumstances of a case like this to determine how to best defend against these types of subsequent charges.